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Summary
This report compares the major provisions of three versions of auditor and
accounting reform legislation. Set out are the versions of H.R. 3763 passed by the
House on April 24, 2002, passed by the Senate on July 15, 2002, and the conference
version that was approved by both houses of Congress as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 on July 26, 2002.  President Bush indicated that he would sign the measure into
law within a few days.
The cornerstone of U.S. securities regulation is disclosure.  According to this
approach, the best way to protect investors from fraud, hype, and irrational
exuberance is to require companies selling stocks and bonds to the public to disclose
detailed information about their financial strengths and weaknesses.  Without
complete and accurate information, investors cannot make rational decisions, and the
market cannot allocate funds to the most productive users.  Ill-informed investment
choices hurt individual investors, but there are also costs to the national economy in
terms of wasted resources, jobs not created, and innovations forgone.  If investors
decide they cannot trust corporate disclosures, they will be less likely to buy stocks
and bonds, raising the cost of capital for all firms, good and bad.  Since the market’s
peak in early 2000, U.S. stocks have lost about $7 trillion in value.  The share prices
of firms that fail to meet their own profit projections, or Wall Street’s expectations,
are apt to plummet.  The desire to avoid or postpone stock market losses creates a
powerful incentive for corporate management to engage in accounting practices that
conceal bad news.  The cases of Enron, WorldCom, and a growing list of others
suggest that this incentive is often strong enough to overwhelm the watchdog
mechanisms in place to prevent deceptive financial reporting.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to restore confidence in corporate reporting by
enhancing the oversight of financial accounting.  The measure creates a new
oversight body to regulate independent auditors (whose certification the law requires
to be affixed to the annual reports of all publicly traded corporations).  Under
previous practice, auditors were regulated mainly by private professional accounting
groups; the new board will also be private, but will operate under the direct oversight
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  A majority of the five board members
will be non-accountants.  The board will have sweeping powers to inspect
accounting firms, set rules and standards for auditing, and impose sanctions on
violators. Auditors will be prohibited from providing certain non-audit consulting
services to their audit clients, and the oversight role of the board of directors will be
strengthened.  Top corporate officials will have to personally attest to the accuracy
of their firm’s accounting (and face penalties if financial statements are later found
to be erroneous). Stock trades by corporate insiders will have to be made public
within two days, and most loans by companies to their executives will be prohibited.
This report traces the evolution of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by comparing the major
features of the bills passed by the House, the Senate, and the conference committee.
It will not be updated further.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
A Side-by-Side Comparison of House,
Senate, and Conference Versions
The table below presents a side-by-side comparison of three versions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: (1) H.R. 3763 as passed by the House on April 24,
2002; (2) H.R. 3763 as passed by the Senate on July 15, 2002( with the S. 2673 as
an amendment in the nature of a substitute); and (3) the conference version approved
by both houses of Congress on July 25, 2002.  
The provisions are set out in eight categories:
! creation of a new auditor oversight body;
! auditor independence;
! enhanced accounting disclosure requirements;
! stock analysts;
! corporate executive accountability;
! corporate boards; 
! increased penalties for securities law violations; and
! other provisions.
The appendix to this report summarizes the two ten-point plans put forward by
President Bush.
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Table 1.  Comparison of Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: House, Senate, and Conference Versions
Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
I.  Creation of a New Auditor Oversight Board.






Number of board members Five Five Five




could be CPAs, provided
they had not worked in the
accounting industry for 2
years; and at least one
member must never have
been a CPA
Three must never have
been accountants; two may
be accountants, but if an
accountant is to be
chairman, he or she must
not have been in active
practice for 5 years
Follows Senate bill
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Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Scope of board’s activity (1) to review auditors’
work product, (2) to
enforce (but not set)
standards of competency
and professional ethics,
and (3) to review conflicts
of interest between
auditors and their clients.
(1) set auditing, quality
control, and independence
standards, (2) inspect the
auditing operations of
public accounting firms
(required to register with
the board and file annual
reports if they audited
public companies), and (3)
investigate violations of
securities laws, standards
of ethics, competency, and
conduct set by the 
accounting profession, and
the board’s own rules
Follows Senate bill




All accounting firms that
audit public companies
Follows Senate bill




Disciplinary powers Could impose a variety of
sanctions, including a
determination that a firm is
not qualified to audit
public companies.  SEC
and state accountancy
boards would be notified
of final sanctions
Could impose a variety of
sanctions, including a
determination that a firm is
not qualified to audit
public companies. SEC
and state accountancy






corporations.  SEC and
state boards of
accountancy would be
notified of final sanctions





Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
SEC oversight authority to
abrogate, add to, or modify
any of the board’s rules?
Yes Yes Yes.  Further specifies that
the SEC can assign to the
board duties and
responsibilities not
included in the statute
Source of funding Specifies that the board




Funded (1) by accountants,
who would pay the cost of
mandatory registration
with the board, and (2) by
companies that sell
securities to the public,
who would be assessed a
fee proportional to the
value of their securities in
circulation in the public
market.
Follows Senate bill, with
further provision that fines
collected by the board are
to fund merit scholarships
for accounting students. 
Fees that fund the board
will also fund FASB
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Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
II. Auditor Independence.
Bans on provision of
certain non-audit services
by auditors to their clients
Directs the SEC to revise
its auditor independence






work for companies for
which it is the outside
auditor.  (Under current
SEC rules, auditors are
barred from supervising or
managing their clients’
information systems, and
from performing more than
40% of their clients’
internal audits.)
Amends statute to ban
financial system design
and internal audit work. 
Existing SEC regulations
against provision of certain
other non-audit services
are also incorporated into
the statute.  Except in
certain cases, the Senate
bill stipulates that auditors
may provide permitted
consulting services (such
as tax preparation) to their
audit clients only with the
approval of the audit
committee of the client’s
board of directors
Follows Senate bill, and
adds provision that an
audit of an insurance
company required by state
law meets the definition of
an “audit service”
Who would set auditor
independence standards?
The SEC The new board Follows Senate bill
Auditor rotation No provision Requires the rotation of the
lead audit partner after
auditing a company for
five consecutive years. 
Calls for a study of
mandatory rotation of
audit firms





as well as the “lead”
partner
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Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Auditor/client employment
relationships
No provision Bars an accountant from
serving as the outside
auditor for a company
where a top officer had
been employed by the
accountant within the past
year
Follows Senate bill
 III. Enhanced Accounting Disclosure Requirements.
Insider transactions in
corporate securities
Stock trades by corporate
insiders must be reported
electronically to the public
on the business day
following the transaction. 
(Under current rules,
disclosure may not be
required for weeks or
months.)
Insider trades must be
reported to the public
within two business days
of the transaction
Insider trades must be
reported to the SEC by the
second business day after
the transaction (unless the
SEC finds this is not
feasible), and the SEC
must display the filings on
its web site the day after








Require disclosure of any




Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Other disclosures required Real-time disclosure of
events that would be
material to investors’
decisions to buy or sell. 
The SEC would determine
the kinds of events subject
to real-time reporting
Directs SEC to make rules
to require that (1) pro-
forma financial statements




reconciled with GAAP and
that (2) corrections or
adjustments of past
financial statements that




Adopts both House and
Senate provisions
Enhance SEC review of
corporate financial
statements
Requires SEC to establish
a risk rating system to
determine how often a
firm’s financial statements
should be reviewed
No provision Requires SEC to inspect
companies’ financial
statements at least every 3
years (and more often for
large firms)
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Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Accounting standards
setting







(rather than by the
accounting industry).  Also









regulation of Wall Street
analysts
Directs the SEC to study
conflicts of interest that
may affect analysts
Directs the SEC or the
NASD (which regulates
stockbrokers) to adopt
rules of conduct for stock










Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
V. Corporate Executive Accountability.
Requires personal
certification of financial
statements by CEOs and
CFOs?
No Yes.  Also requires
certification of the





or willfully certifying a
false or misleading
statement




certification, and imposes a
knowledge standard. 
Follows Senate bill in
requiring certification of






statements are found to be
erroneous?




transactions, and to adopt a
rule to require
disgorgement if needed
CEOs and CFOs would
forfeit both trading profits
and bonuses received in
the 12 months before a
financial report was
restated as the result of
misconduct
Follows Senate bill









through SEC civil or
administrative actions
against securities law
violators, and gifts or
donations
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Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Personal loans by firms to
top executives and
directors
Must be disclosed Prohibited, unless the loan
is made in the normal
course of business on the
same terms available to
public borrowers
Follows Senate bill, with
added exemptions for
charge cards and  margin
loans to employees of
securities firms
Authorizes SEC to bar
violators of securities laws
from serving as officers or
directors of any publicly
traded company?
Yes Yes Yes
Makes it a criminal offense
for an officer or director of










None Makes the audit committee
of the board of directors





would be prohibited from
accepting consulting fees
from the company, and





“whistle blower” reports. 
At least one member of the
audit committee would
have to be a “financial




Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Auditor report to audit
committee
No provision Requires the independent
auditor to report to the







VII.  Increased Penalties for Securities Law Violations.




Senate bill, except as

















Senate bill, except as
regards jail terms (see
below)
Raises fines and jail terms
for several offenses,
including mail and wire
fraud, certification of a
false financial statement,




Follows Senate bill, but
see below for changes
regarding jail terms
Prison terms No provision, but H.R.
5118 increases maximum
sentence for above




offenses from 5 to 10 years
Adopts provisions of H.R.
5118
CRS-13
Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version
Statute of limitations in
securities fraud cases
No provision Increases statute of
limitations from 1 year of
discovery or 3 years of
occurrence of fraud, to 2




SEC budget No provision, but H.R.
3764, passed by the House
on 6/26/02, authorizes
$776 million for the SEC
in FY2003
Authorizes appropriations
for the SEC for FY2003 of
$776 million, as opposed














Directs SEC to issue rules
of professional
responsibility for attorneys





securities while a pension





Provision H.R. 3763 (House) H.R. 3763 (Senate) Conference Version




offerings of penny stocks
Studies required Calls for the SEC to study




for the GAO to study the




Directs the SEC to study
bond rating agencies and 
mandatory rotation of
audit firms, and the GAO
to study the effects of
mergers in the accounting
industry





securities law violators and
enforcement programs, and
mandatory auditor rotation,
and for the GAO to study
effects of mergers in the
accounting industry and





APPENDIX A.  President Bush’s 10-Point Plans
In speeches on March 7, 2002, and July 9, 2002, President Bush set out a ten-
point program on accounting and auditing reform (in March) followed by ten
enforcement initiatives (in July).  There is considerable overlap between the
President’s proposals and the legislative and regulatory initiatives compared above.
Major elements of the President’s speech in March  included:
! the establishment of an Independent Regulatory Board to develop
standards of auditing ethics and competence, under SEC oversight;
! a call for the SEC to improve corporate disclosure and to increase
the number of events and kinds of news that must be disclosed
immediately;
! a requirement that CEOs personally vouch for the accuracy of their
firms’ financial statements, and face disgorgement of bonuses if
those statements were later found to be erroneous;
! authority for the SEC to bar corporate officers and directors who
abuse their power from serving at other publicly traded firms;
! prompt disclosure of corporate insiders’ stock transactions;
! more effective oversight of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board by the SEC, to ensure that accounting rules respond to the
needs of public investors; and
! a requirement that auditors compare a firm’s accounting systems to
a best practice standard, rather than to minimum requirements.
In July 2002, the President’s speech included these elements:
! creation by Executive Order of a financial crimes “swat team” in the
Department of Justice to coordinate the investigation and
prosecution of securities fraud;
! proposes to increase penalties for wire and mail fraud and crimes
committed by corporate officers, and calls on the Federal Sentencing
Commission to ensure that corporate insiders convicted of fraud
serve longer terms in prison;
! a proposal to allow the SEC to freeze payments to corporate insiders
while the company is under investigation;
! proposes to prevent corporate insiders from profiting from erroneous
financial statements;
! proposes to allow the SEC to bar corporate officers and directors
who abuse their power from serving at other publicly traded firms;
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! prompt disclosure of corporate insiders’ stock transactions;
! proposes to strengthen laws that criminalize document shredding
and other forms of obstruction of justice;
! calls on public companies’ compensation committees to prevent
corporate officers from receiving loans from their companies;
! challenges CEOs to comply with the spirit of existing disclosure
rules by explaining how their compensation packages are in the best
interests of their companies’ shareholders, and describing in plain
English in their companies’ annual  reports every detail of their
compensation packages;
! calls on the nation’s stock markets to require that a majority of a
company’s directors be truly independent so that they have no
material relationship with the company;
! calls on the nation’s stock markets to require listed companies to
receive shareholder approval for all stock option plans; and
! calls for an additional $100 million (above the $469 million budget
request) for the SEC in FY2003.
 
